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Abstract
In the paper we argue that no neat border line between ontology and epistemology can 
be drawn. This is due to the fact that the separation between factual and conceptual is 
rather fuzzy, and the world is characterized by a sort of ontological opacity which makes 
the construction of any absolute ontology difficult. Our ontology is characterized by 
the fact that the things of nature are seen by us in terms of a conceptual apparatus 
that is inevitably influenced by mind-involving elements, and all this has important 
consequences on both the question of scientific realism and the realism/anti-realism 
debate. Conceptualization gives us access to the world, while, on the other, it is the 
most important feature of our cultural evolution. While the idealistic thesis according 
to which the mind produces natural reality looks hardly tenable, it is reasonable to 
claim instead that we perceive this same reality by having recourse to the filter of a 
conceptual apparatus whose presence is, in turn, connected to the development of 
language and social organization.
Our science is essentially relational, and not absolute. The information with which 
it provides us is appropriate, but from our point of view. Science provides reliable 
information on the world, but this information is always relative to a particular 
framework, and it is a mistake to think that the limits of our cognitive capacities only 
have an aprioristic character. Science constantly attempts at providing answers to our 
questions about how things stand in the world, and thus purports to offer reliable 
information about it. But it should also be recognized that the extent to which science 
succeeds in accomplishing this task is disputable. What kind of realism, thus, can we 
actually endorse? Despite what many relativists claim, realism still is an arguable and 
defendable position. If one asks what difference is made to our knowledge claims if we 
accept the existence of an extra-conceptual world, the answer is the following: such 
recognition undermines the diffused anthropocentric stance which identifies reality 
with our limited knowledge of it.
Keywords: Realism, Anti-Realism, Ontology, Epistemology, Conceptual Apparatus, 
Nature.
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To what extent are we entitled to draw a border line between ontology and 
epistemology? To many contemporary thinkers a positive answer to this question 
looks attractive, mainly because it reflects convictions deeply entrenched in our 
common sense view of the world. However - they argue - anyone wishing to clarify 
the distinction between the ontological and the epistemological dimensions, without 
having recourse to unwarranted dogmas, should recognize that such a positive 
answer poses more problems than it is meant to solve. This is due to the fact that 
the separation between factual and conceptual is not sharp and clean, but rather 
fuzzy.1 To this recognition another remark should be added. As long as humans are 
concerned - so the argument goes - the world is characterized by a sort of “ontological 
opacity” which makes the construction of any absolute ontology very difficult. Our 
ontology is characterized by the fact that the things of nature are seen by us in terms 
of a conceptual apparatus that is inevitably influenced by mind-involving elements.2 
All this has important consequences on both the question of scientific realism and the 
realism/anti-realism debate.
Theoretically, we may admit that a distinction can be drawn between the natural 
world on the one hand, and the social-linguistic world on the other. However, 
according to many authors, it should not be difficult to understand that we began 
to identify ourselves and the objects that surround us only when the social-linguistic 
world emerged from the natural one, and this in turn means that our criteria of 
identification are essentially social and linguistic. Leaving aside any kind of Platonism, 
and recognizing - in a pragmatist vein - that the concept of “truth” is essentially tied 
to human interests, we need an intersubjective criterion giving rise to the notion of a 
world which is both objective and mind-independent. In other words, as John Dewey 
stated, the distinction subject/object is not to be found in nature: it arises when men 
have such an intersubjective criterion, i.e., within a social world which is created by 
men themselves.3 But it is important to note at the onset that these remarks do not 
entail the total identification of the aforementioned two worlds. The conclusion is 
rather that, of the natural world as such, little can be said. We can admit that a border 
line between ontology and epistemology really exists but, as long as we are concerned, 
such a distinction looks less definable today than it was usually thought to be in the 
past.
There are two reasons which explain why things are so. On the one hand 
conceptualization gives us access to the world, while, on the other, it is the most 
important feature of our cultural evolution (which is distinct from - although not 
1 It goes without saying that the reference work in this case still is Quine’s classical paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, in W.V.O. 
Quine (1980), pp. 20-46. For a more recent perspective see J. McDowell (1994).
2 A view of this kind is endorsed in N. Rescher (1992).
3 See especially J. Dewey (1994). Davidson exploits Dewey’s insight in D. Davidson (1990).
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totally alien to - biological evolution).4 This does not mean to diminish the importance 
of the latter, which is specifically geared to the natural world and, after all, precedes 
our cultural development from the chronological viewpoint. However, it is cultural 
evolution that distinguishes us from all other living beings. While the idealistic 
thesis according to which the mind produces natural reality looks hardly tenable, it 
is reasonable to claim instead that we perceive this same reality by having recourse 
to the filter of a conceptual apparatus whose presence is, in turn, connected to the 
development of language and social organization.
All this, once again, prevents a clear distinction between ontology and epistemology. 
For example, it might be stated that ontology’s task is to discover what kinds of 
entities make up the world (“what there is”, in Quine’s terms), while epistemology’s 
job is to ascertain what are the principles by which we get to know reality. It is 
obvious, however, that if our conceptual apparatus is at work even when we try to 
pave our way towards an unconceptualized reality, our access to it entails anyhow 
the involvement of the mind. Resorting to a paradox, it might even be said that any 
unconceptualized reality turns out to be an image of the mind (even though, it is 
worth repeating it, this recognition does not force us to deny the mind-independent 
existence of unconceptualized reality).
At this point an important problem must be faced. Since the rejection of any 
scheme/content distinction looks hardly tenable,5 the question arises whether it is 
more appropriate to speak of ‘scheme’ (singular) or of ‘schemes’ (plural). This is not 
a rhetorical question, as it might seem at first sight. What lies behind it is, rather, 
the question of ontological pluralism, which is in turn connected to the existence of 
possible alternative ways of conceptualizing the world.
The importance of such a question was clearly understood by William James. At the 
beginning of the past century, in fact, he wrote that:
It is possible to imagine alternative universes to the one we know, in which the most 
various grades and types of union should be embodied [...] we can imagine a world of 
things and of kinds in which the causal interactions with which we are so familiar should 
not exist.6
James went on saying:
The ‘absolutely’ true, meaning what no farther experience will ever alter, is that ideal 
vanishing-point towards which we imagine that all our temporary truths will some day 
4 The distinction biological/cultural evolution is constantly present in pragmatist authors like James, Peirce, and Dewey. For a 
contemporary assessment see N. Rescher (1990).
5 See especially D. Davidson (1985), and R. Rorty (1982). We cannot take this problem into account here for reasons of space. 
For a recent criticism of Davidson’s and Rorty’s positions see S. Haack (1993).
6 W. James (1907), pp.156-157.
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converge [...] meanwhile we have to live to-day by what truth we can get to-day, and be 
ready to-morrow to call it falsehood.7
The conclusion of this line of reasoning is that the great scientific and metaphysical 
theories of the past were adequate for centuries but, since human experience has 
boiled over those limits, we now call these theories only relatively true. Those limits 
were in fact casual, and “might have been transcended by past theorists just as they 
are by present thinkers”.8
James was not the first to note that our world-view can never be absolute, and that 
intelligent creatures whose experiential modes are substantially different from our own 
are bound to conceptualize reality in a rather diverse way. James, however, provided 
us with a clear picture which anticipates the contemporary debate on conceptual 
schemes. He claimed in this respect that:
In practical talk, a man’s common sense means his good judgement, his freedom from 
excentricity [...] In philosophy it means something entirely different, it means his use of 
certain intellectual forms or categories of thought. Were we lobsters, or bees, it might 
be that our organization would have led to our using quite different modes from these 
of apprehending our experiences. It might be too (we can not dogmatically deny this) 
that such categories, unimaginable by us to-day, would have proved on the whole as 
serviceable for handling our experiences mentally as those which we actually use.9
Someone might object that these are only mental experiments, whose importance 
cannot be overevaluated. However, mental experiments play a key role in both 
philosophy and science. No doubt they are merely hypothetical devices, but they also 
allow us to enter the dimension of possibility. By resorting to them, we are able to 
imagine how the world could have been in the past, could be today, or could turn 
out to be in the future. This is a specific characteristic of our relationship with the 
world, which is strictly connected to the cultural type of evolution mentioned above. 
Rationality is, thus, largely a matter of idealization. Although our natural origins and 
evolutionary heritage must be duly deemed important, we must give way as well to the 
recognition that there is indeed something that makes us unique. Only human beings 
are able to take idealities into account and to somehow detach themselves from the 
actual world. Rationality may also be seen as the expression of mankind’s capacity to 
see not only how things actually are, but also how they might have been and how they 
could turn out to be if we were to take some courses of action rather than others: the 
concept of possibility plays indeed a key role. It should eventually be noted that the 
dimension of possibility plays quite an important role even in the scientific domain, 
since scientific theories concern possible rather than actual reality. Newton’s theory 
7 Ibid., pp. 222-223.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 171.
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of universal gravitation takes into account the ideal mass in ideal space, and its status 
of scientific theory is granted by the fact that it holds for any mass.
In short, possibilia are a key component of our social-linguistic world, i.e., of the 
specifically human way of dealing with reality. Possible worlds and possible individuals 
are actual or potential products of our conceptual apparatus, and any strategy meant 
at eliminating them appears doomed for failure. The dimension of the possibility, 
besides being strictly tied to hypothetical reasoning, plays a fundamental role in our 
comprehension of both the natural and social-linguistic worlds. But it should also be 
clear that the dimension of possibility must anyhow make reference to some kind of 
agent, and the agent itself is thus an inevitable point of departure. We are compelled 
to adopt such a stance, because this is the only way opened to us for gaining access to 
the world. No one denies that it would be good to transcend our conceptual machinery 
in order to glimpse at how the world really is, independently of any view we can hold 
about it. This, however, cannot be done because of the very way we are made. Unlike 
some forms of classical idealism, we can recognize the presence of things that are 
real in the sense of being mind-independent but, on the other hand, a specification 
is needed to the effect that human beings have access to those things only via their 
conceptual apparatus.
Starting from such premises, it is reasonable to claim that (1) analytic and synthetic 
cannot be clearly separated, and (2) no neatly determinable distinction can be drawn 
between science and metaphysics. As Quine stated in the 1950s,
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters 
of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure 
mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along 
the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary 
conditions are experience [...] Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle 
has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference 
is there in principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded 
Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?10
A follower of scientism might at this point be tempted to state the unconditioned 
superiority of the scientific world-view over the image of the world that Wilfrid Sellars 
used to define the ‘manifest image’, i.e. the commonsense image which is shared - 
in its large features - by all men qua men.11 But is it really plausible to claim that 
science deserves the primary role in assessing any kind of conceptual scheme? What 
guarantees can science provide in this regard? And, above all, which science are we 
talking about in this context? No doubt the real world contains those entities which 
would be posited by an ‘ideally complete’ science such as the one envisioned by 
10 W.V.O. Quine (1980), pp. 42-43.
11 See W. Sellars (1963).
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Charles S. Peirce. But this ideal completeness is not available, and we are therefore 
compelled to work with what we have at our disposal now. This takes us back to the 
current scientific world-view, that is to say, the one provided by today science. We 
must face, in sum, a notion of truth which is essentially ‘relative’ and bound to evolve 
with the passing of time.
In other words, the presence of a sort of Peircean ideal community of scientific 
researchers who are supposedly able to attain the ‘real truth’ about the world is not 
an option, but an indispensable condition for the truthfulness of our generalizations 
about reality. Peirce, in fact, made clear that the key characteristic of truth is stability, 
and that a true belief must at least be fated to be underwritten by the operation of 
scientific method.12 Of course we cannot rule out the possibility that such an ideal 
community will exist in the future, but history of science should at least prompt us 
to be pessimistic in this regard. Ideal science, even when its realization is referred to 
the future, looks more a philosophical utopia than a feasible accomplishment (even 
though, as is well known, utopias are indeed useful when they are viewed as essentially 
‘regulative’ ideas). The strong realistic thesis that science faithfully describes the real 
world turns out to be, thus, just a matter of intent.
The fact is that scientific world-views continuously evolve, which means that the 
scientific enterprise has an essentially historical character. As Werner Heisenberg 
pointed out, science always is the result of the encounter between the natural world 
on the one side, and human conceptions, practical interests and needs on the other.13 
The appeal to mental experiments is useful not only in daily life, but in the scientific 
domain too, because in this case science itself makes us understand that it permits us 
to know the world from a particular perspective, that is in turn geared to the specific 
relationships we entertain with the environment which surrounds us. John Dewey used 
the term transaction to denote this encounter, where the respective contributions of 
the observer and of the observed reality cannot be rigidly distinguished.14
This means that our science is essentially relational, and not absolute. The information 
with which it provides us is appropriate, but from our point of view. The Jamesian 
point that it is possible to imagine alternative universes to the one we know, and 
that intelligent creatures whose experiential modes are substantially different from 
our own are bound to interpret reality in a diverse way, must be taken seriously. In 
other words, we should recognize that the natural environment in which we live (and 
of which we are a substantial part) has an essential bearing on conceptualization, 
including the scientific one. Science provides reliable information on the world, but 
this information is always relative to a particular framework, and it is a mistake to think 
12 For a good analysis of this point see N. Rescher (1978).
13 W. Heisenberg (2000).
14 J. Dewey (1994).
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that the limits of our cognitive capacities only have an aprioristic character. We are 
mainly bound by empirical limits, due to the fact that we inquire into nature by means 
of an apparatus which answers certain stimuli, but not others. However, nothing in our 
actual science leads us to rule out the hypothesis that, in other natural environments, 
the development of science might have taken quite a different course.15 In order to 
give plausibility to this hypothesis, we must only admit the existence of worlds whose 
natural environment is substantially diverse from our own, and certainly this is not 
mere science fiction.
By saying this, we leave the domain of mental experiments to enter that of hypotheses 
which are - at least in principle - empirically verifiable. No doubt our science today is 
the only science we know, but this should not lead us to exclude the possibility that 
there are other ways of investigating nature. After all, science tells us that there are 
many aspects of reality that we cannot get in touch with by means of our sensory 
apparatus (which is the product of a process of evolution which took place in particular 
environmental conditions). Therefore we should not uncritically accept Davidson’s 
statement that “since there is at most one world, these pluralities are metaphorical or 
merely imagined”.16
The question now is the following: are we authorized to claim than any absolutely 
objective ontology should then be left in the background, because little can be known 
about it? It should be noted that not only philosophers, but even many professional 
scientists have often denied the validity of the general picture of the world that the 
man of the street takes more or less for granted. In our century uncertainty about 
the content of our theories has grown fast, together with the feeling that there are 
alternative theories that can account equally well for all possible observations. Clearly 
the threat of relativism arises at this point, even though many authors nowadays no 
longer take relativism to be a threat, but just a matter of fact.
All this explains why the issue of conceptual schemes is important for both philosophers 
and scientists. For example, according to Niels Bohr’s principle of complementarity we 
have, on the one side, a sort of Kantian world-in-itself which is both unknowable and 
undescribable, and on the other side an ‘us’ which, unlike in Kant’s picture, is not stable 
and determined. This means that, in our inquiries about the world, different questions 
can all receive coherent answers, with the disquieting effect that a comprehensive 
and coherent image of reality cannot be achieved. It is as if, conducting different 
experiments, we were to change conceptual scheme: the world experienced will in any 
case be diverse, and there is no way to combine the world of our experience with the 
various, differing conceptual schemes. The peculiar form of quantum effects entails 
that ordinary classical ideas about the nature of the physical world are profoundly 
15 Interesting remarks on this topic can be found in N. Rescher (1984).
16 D. Davidson (1985), p. 187.
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incorrect, and some contemporary physicists endorse in this respect views which 
recall William James’ characterization of consciousness as a “selecting agency”.17
Obviously things were different when logical positivism still was the dominant 
doctrine in the philosophy of science. In that case the main purpose was to individuate 
the immutable models that lie beyond concrete scientific practice, because it was 
commonly held by the main representatives of neopositivism that science is objective 
and progressive in the cumulative sense of the term. It must be stressed, however, 
that the distance from the neopositivist model does not lead one automatically closer 
to some kind of methodological anarchism or postmodernism (in Rorty’s sense of the 
term). Some authors, in fact, claim that science can effectively validate a plausible 
commitment to the actual existence of its theoretical entities. But scientific conceptions 
can get, at most, a rough consonance between our scientific ideas and reality.18 And 
this statement should not sound surprising, if only one recalls what we said before 
about the difficulty to trace a precise border line between ontology and epistemology.
The general picture that emerges from the preceding remarks is the following. It 
is certainly correct to state that science means to offer correct information about 
the world, but the extent to which it succeeds in accomplishing this task is always 
questionable. We cannot claim that the picture provided by today science - our current 
scientific image of the world - is absolutely correct, because the history of science itself 
shows us that any such statement is likely to be rejected by future generations. While 
it may be recognized that science purports to offer a correct description of the real 
world, the past experience should also prompt us to accept its claims sub condicione, 
and to view them as merely provisional.
It has often been said in this regard that the actual unobservability of scientific entities 
rests on contingent facts, which depend on both the nature of the unobserved thing 
and the features of our perceptual mechanisms. This means that things which were in 
the past unobservable became observable later on, because we were able to artificially 
extend our perceptual capacities by means of such technologically advanced scientific 
instruments as microscopes and telescopes. By accepting these premises, any neat 
demarcation between observable and unobservable entities is not significant from 
an ontological point of view. It should be noted, however, that if we reject the realist 
perspective as long as scientific unobservable entities are concerned, even realism 
in general must be abandoned. Following this line of thought unobservable scientific 
entities are just contingently unobservable, so that their unobservability (due, for 
instance, to smallness of size) presents the same, resolvable difficulties that one has 
to deal with when far distant celestial bodies are taken into account (in the latter case, 
spatial location is the problem at issue).
17 See, for example, H. Stapp (1993).
18 Such a stance is defended in N. Rescher (1987).
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The preceding arguments may be accepted with some reservations. Clearly, we must 
be ready to admit the reality of the so-called theoretical entities if we want to avoid 
any instrumentalistic conception of scientific knowledge. After all, it is easy to verify 
that for the operative scientists prediction and control are important just because they 
are supposed to monitor the adequacy of our scientific theories about reality. This 
is reason why antirealism has never been popular among scientists. As the physicist 
Steven Weinberg has it,
The insights of philosophers have occasionally benefited physicists, but generally in a 
negative fashion - by protecting them from the preoccupations of other philosophers 
[...] Physicists do of course carry around with them a working philosophy. For most of 
us, it is a rough-and-ready realism, a belief in the objective reality of the ingredients of 
our scientific theories.19
In other words, while it is correct to state the fallibility and continuous corrigibility of 
science, starting from these premises we are not allowed to draw the conclusion that 
no existential and descriptive claims about the real world should be made in scientific 
theorizing.
Science constantly attempts at providing answers to our questions about how things 
stand in the world, and thus purports to offer reliable information about it. But it 
should also be recognized that the extent to which science succeeds in accomplishing 
this task is disputable. No doubt relativity theory and quantum mechanics are the 
best scientific theories we have at our disposal now, but to assume that they will still 
be deemed adequate in the future is rather dangerous. Even theoretical entities of 
science are introduced for a utilitarian mission, i.e., to provide the materials of causal 
explanation for the real behavior of real things. This means that science is not a merely 
practical instrument for prediction and control that has no bearing on describing the 
nature of the world. Our science’s claims regard the real world, but they always are 
tentative.
All we are entitled to say is that if today science (our present science) is correct, then 
the so-called theoretical entities exist and possess the characteristic features that it 
envisions. No science would indeed be possible without this basic realistic attitude, 
because its very aim is to provide an ontologically founded picture of reality. In 
understanding this fact, a philosopher of science has to recognize, on the one side, 
the descriptive and explanatory role that science purports to play, while, on the other, 
he must also stress that science is bound to be imperfect and fallible in its execution of 
such a role. It may also be noted, in this regard, that the supporters of instrumentalism 
usually endorse their position on grounds of a commitment to empiricism. But the type 
of empiricism they espouse is uncommon, because traditional empiricism is known as 
19 S. Weinberg (1992), pp. 166-167.
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the doctrine that any type of descriptive knowledge of the world must be grounded 
in experience. Since instrumentalists, instead, claim that experience cannot provide 
any descriptive knowledge of the real (extraphenomenal) world, their doctrine may 
be characterized as a full-fledged anti-empiricist stance.
At this point we are confronted by a crucial question: what kind of realism - if any - can 
we actually endorse? The question becomes even more important if we recall that, 
for the reasons stated above, many authors claim that no border between ontology 
and epistemology can be outlined. It is often stated that, in order to provide realism 
with a solid foundation, we need recourse to a reality that is totally independent of 
thought (and let alone of language).20 We should, therefore, ask ourselves: What can 
we possibly think about this reality, and how can we say what it is like? Even when we 
imagine a world totally devoid of human presence, we must use human concepts. As 
we said previously, conceptualization is not an optional we can get rid of, but a built-in 
component of the nature of human beings.
Is it true, however, that the aforementioned claim heavily relies on the presence of 
an alleged capacity to get a view of the world which is totally independent from the 
experiencing subject? As is well known, such thesis has constantly been rejected 
by the pragmatist tradition. Writing about Russell’s and Dewey’s divergent opinions 
about logic, Tom Burke has made the following interesting remarks:
For both Dewey and Russell, a certain amount of conceptual stage setting has to go 
on prior to presenting a semantic theory [...] For Russell, we have to be able to make 
certain assumptions about the world independent of our experience of it. The world 
is in this view carved up into objects having properties and standing in relations, and 
we have only to open our eyes to note such facts [...] For Dewey, one jumps the gun 
by a long shot by making certain independent and sweeping claims about the world in 
this manner. In taking this stance, one is less than a step away from embracing a view 
referred to by Dewey as the ‘spectator theory of knowledge’, namely, the view that we 
can say something about the world (as it ‘really’ is) independent of our participation in 
it. Russell commits himself, qua logician, to such a view to the extent that he assumes 
a world full of facts without questioning how we come to grips with such facts in our 
experience, opting to focus solely on the abstract study of propositional or linguistic 
systems.21
In the philosophy of science, this means that we can never assume that a particular 
scientific theory gives us the true picture of reality, since we know perfectly well from 
the history of science that, in a future we cannot actually foresee, it will be replaced 
by a better theory. And it should be noted, moreover, that this future theory will be 
better for future scientists, but not the best in absolute terms, since its final destiny 
20 In other words, we should adopt what Putnam calls the “God’s Eye Point of View”; see H. Putnam (1981).
21 T. Burke (1994), pp. 56-57.
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is to be displaced by yet another theory. The current state of scientific knowledge is 
one among other cognitive states that share the same imperfection. There is indeed a 
strong prospect that many or most of our current scientific theories will be recognized 
to be inadequate: our current scientific knowledge is nothing but a set of hypotheses, 
many or most of which will be regarded as untenable. Not only are we not in a position 
to claim that our knowledge of reality is complete; we are not even in a position to 
claim that our knowledge of reality is correct. We need a more modest view in this 
case. Just as we think now that our predecessors held an inadequate vision of the 
world, so it is reasonable to assume that our successors will hold the same opinion 
about our vision of the world.
Science, in sum, is not a stable system, but a dynamic process, and this fact leads to 
view as problematic all those conceptions that place on the shoulders of future science 
the burden of perfection. Science is not rational because it has a solid foundation, 
but because it is a continuously evolving self-correcting enterprise, whose claims 
are always open to the possibility of revision. It is a continuous quest for optimal 
solutions whose final destiny, however, is to be overcome. For this reason it is better to 
endorse a modest realism. The strong version of scientific realism ignores a basic fact: 
we can never trust completely and in detail what our actual scientific theories claim, 
since history shows that, sooner or later, they will be replaced. This is the reason why 
history of science plays a key role, and in this regard we think that something more can 
be said. Even the history of the philosophy of science is important, since it makes us 
understand how the models by which philosophers interpret science (and reflect on it) 
change.22 We should be skeptical about any proposal which aims at distinguishing in a 
rigid manner science from metaphysics. There is no atemporal ‘scientific image of the 
world’, but many images located in the flux of time. The very image of common sense 
which - apparently at least - is quite stable, continuously evolves and incorporates 
elements coming from the various scientific images.
If we claim that the science of our day provides the true picture of how the world 
really is, we seriously risk (given the concrete situation in which we happen to live) to 
hypostatize something that simply is a contingent and historically determined product 
of our action. This product is valid in a particular period of our cultural evolution, and an 
approach such as the one previously envisioned should prevent us from claiming that 
the ontology of today science is the absolute ontology that so many metaphysicians 
were looking for in the past. The preceding remarks prompt us to conclude that 
relativism and fallibilism are not ghosts to be afraid of, but just inevitable factors of 
our relationship with the surrounding environment. Richard Rorty was - at least in 
22 See, for instance, D. Oldroyd (1986).
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this case - right when he noted that natural science is not a natural kind,23 since it is 
essentially geared to historical and cognitive values.
However, it is essential to note that the aforementioned remarks do not necessarily 
lead towards some form of antirealism. It is correct to state that, due to our cognitive 
position in the world and its limitations, the perspective provided by the conceptual 
framework we employ cannot be transcended. This amounts to saying that, although 
the world does not need our participation in order to be, our epistemic access to the 
world is given by such participation. Any description, thus, is bound to be determined 
by our operational perspectives. We are better not to say much about an absolute 
reality, even though we may push our imagination so far as to imagine how it could 
be. Our ontology is always bound to have epistemological commitments or, to put it in 
different terms, ontological commitments cannot be denied an epistemological side.
Our science is bound to be imperfect because we, humans beings who construct it, 
are imperfect creatures. In order to obtain final and metaphysically strong answers we 
should detach ourselves from contingency, but we will never be able to do this. We 
get to know the natural environment by using scientific instruments and formulating 
scientific theories, but the history of the natural world with which we are acquainted 
always is a history that refers to human beings, because we develop it by having 
recourse to our conceptual apparatus. We can imagine a world in which no conceptual 
scheme is at work because we are able to run the paths of possibility.
On the other hand, however, nothing prevents us from claiming that absolute reality 
- i.e., a reality which does not depend on our cognitive capabilities - is there. After all 
science is not important because it provides us with the correct (i.e., unique) paradigm 
of knowledge. It is important, rather, because it makes us understand that the world is 
- or might be - different from how we see it. And this, once again, casts doubts about a 
strange feature of Davidson’s philosophy: he does not take into account the possibility 
that reality might be different from what we take it to be. We can admit that common 
sense is a sort of background comprehensive theory which grounds everything else 
including science: it is just our standard way of viewing the world and of dealing with 
it. However, we should also recognize that it possesses a practical primacy, and not an 
ontological one.
Even admitting that our ontology depends on communication, and that only 
communication allows us to hold the concept of objective truth,24 we are not allowed 
to claim - as Davidson does - that our view of the world is, in its plainest features, largely 
correct. Starting from these premises, we should instead say that the knowledge of 
our world (the common sense or manifest image, to use once again Sellars’ terms), 
23 R. Rorty (1991).
24 See D. Davidson (2001).
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and not the knowledge of the world as such, is largely correct. Sellars pointed out , in 
fact, that “since this image [the manifest or common sense image of the world] has 
a being which transcends the individual thinker, there is truth and error with respect 
to it, even though the image itself might have to be rejected, in the last analysis, as 
false”.25
As a matter of fact science introduces us to whole dimensions of reality which were 
previously unknown to human beings. This explains that (1) reality-as-such and reality-
as-known-by-us do not always coincide, and that (2) a distinction between ontology 
and epistemology can - and indeed must - be made. Given our cognitive limits such 
a distinction is for sure hard to be drawn but, still, its philosophical importance is so 
evident that any attempt to overcome it leads to the unjustified thesis that no reality 
lies beyond our cognitive capabilities.
We would like to stress that an author like Quine seems - sometimes, at least - aware 
of this fact. In an essay entitled “Existence” he makes the following claims:
Which ontology to ascribe to a man depends on what he does or intends with his 
variables and quantifiers. This second appeal to language is no more to be wondered 
at than the first; for what is in question in both cases is not just what there really is, 
but what someone says or implies that there is. Nowhere in all this should there be any 
suggestion that what there is depends on language [...] It may in this sense be said that 
ontological questions are parochial to our culture. This is not to say that a thing may 
exist for one culture and be non-existent for another. Existence is absolute, and those 
who talk of existence can say so. What is parochial is the talking of it.26
What prevents Quine from fully drawing the proper consequences of these remarks is 
his thesis that ontology is relative to language. Quine is often led to blur any distinction 
between ontology and epistemology because he tends to use interchangeably two 
different meanings of the term “ontology”: (i) what there is and (ii) what we “believe” 
there is.
In the last analysis we would like to stress that, despite what many relativists claim, 
realism still is an arguable and defendable position. Realism is for sure quite an 
unpopular stance today but, for the reasons stated above, we find the standard 
arguments against it by no means conclusive. And, if one asks what difference is made 
to our knowledge claims if we accept the existence of an extra-conceptual world, our 
answer is the following: such recognition is likely to undermine the largely diffused 
anthropocentric stance which identifies reality with our (limited) knowledge of it.
25 W. Sellars (1963), p. 14.
26 W.V.O. Quine (1970), pp. 93-94.
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